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COMPENSATION FOR PASSENGERS OF
HIJACKED AIRCRAFT
ABRAHAM ABRAMOVSKY*
I. INTRODUCTIONON June 11th, 1971, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Howard
L. Franks boarded Transworld Airlines (TWA) flight 358
bound for New York's LaGuardia Airport. Flight 358 finally
arrived in New York a day later. On its arrival only six persons
disembarked.' Howard L. Franks was not one of them, his life
having been snuffed out by a hijacker's bullet. He had made his-
tory-his was the first passenger death stemming from a hijacking
attempt in the United States. What had long been feared had
finally occurred. An innocent air traveler had been murdered in the
United States.
During a six-week period in the summer of 1971, three daring
hijackings involving United States airlines took place. In the inci-
dent which culminated in the death of Howard L. Franks, the
hijacker demanded to be flown to North Vietnam before he was
shot and apprehended by a United States Deputy Marshal. 2 In
a second incident, a pair of hijackers demanded and received one
hundred thousand dollars as ransom for a woman hostage after
having hijacked a Braniff International Aircraft en route from
Mexico to San Antonio, Texas. The hijackers were finally appre-
hended, but not until a terror-ridden flight from Monterey, Mex-
ico, to Lima, Peru, to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to Buenos Aires,
Argentina, had ended.' In a third incident, a hijacked TWA plane
en route from New York to Chicago returned to LaGuardia Air-
port. After permitting the passengers to disembark, the hijacker
and his stewardess hostage were driven to Kennedy Airport so
that his demand to be flown to Italy could be met. In a desperate
effort to avert the second hijacking, an FBI sharpshooter shot and
killed the perpetrator.' Miraculously the stewardess was not
* Member, New York Bar. J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1970;
LL.M., Columbia University, 1971.
1. Four crew members, the hijacker and a United States Deputy Marshal. In an
exchange of gunfire between the hijacker, the United States Deputy Marshal and a co-
pilot, the co-pilot was nearly killed and the stewardess spent the terror-ridden flight
crouched behind a seat. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
2. Id.
3. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1971, at 23, coL. 1.
4. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1971, at 16, col. 1.
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harmed. In these incidents, the hijackers were persuaded to release
the passengers, thus averting multiple deaths. It is doubtful whether
this fortuitous pattern will continue. If it does not, the lives of hun-
dreds and possibly thousands of passengers every year will be im-
periled.
Until several years ago, unlawful seizure of aircraft, and its
counterpart, unlawful interference with aircraft, while constituting
a threat to American and international civil aviation and posing
a nerve-shattering menace to the passengers and crew involved, was
not an everyday experience. In recent times, these criminal acts
have resulted in injury and death to innocent passengers and crew
members, both at home and abroad. Hijackers' unlawful actions
have progressed from the temporary seizure of an aircraft and
its passengers, 5 to the detention of an entire passenger load and
crew for several weeks under intolerable conditions in a hot desert,"
to the maiming of a co-pilot and the killing of a stewardess in
flight.7 In the unlawful interference sphere, the illegal activity has
ranged from the shelling of an aircraft,8 to the maiming and
killing of some passengers,9 to the complete annihilation of all the
passengers and the destruction of an aircraft.1"
Since 1961, 115 hijackings of United States aircraft have
occurred.1 In an effort to combat this criminal activity, a com-
bined federal government and airline industry program to prevent
hijackings has been instituted. There are two major features to
this program. The first is the installation of metal-detecting de-
vices at airport boarding gates coupled with the formulation of a
"hijacker behavioral profile." The metal-detecting devices, or
"magnetometers" as they are commonly called, record the amount
of ferrous metal carried by a passenger. The "hijacker behavioral
5. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1969, at 18, col. 3 (one of the numerous hijackings
to Cuba).
6. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 4.
7. This incident occurred during a successful hijacking from Russia to Turkey.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1970, at I, col. 5.
8. On February 18, 1969, four Arab terrorists attacked an El Al plane in Zurich.
Six passengers were seriously injured in the incident. N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1969, at 1,
col. 6.
9. On December 26, 1968, an El Al plane in Athens, Greece was shelled. In this
incident, Leon Sherdan, an Israeli engineer, was killed and a number of others were
injured. N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
10. A Swiss Air aircraft was destroyed in flight, killing all the passengers and crew
on February 21, 1970. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1970, at 1, col 4.
11. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1971, at 16, col. 2.
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profile,"-a set of behavioral characteristics deemed to be common
to all potential hijackers-was compiled in 1969 by a special task
force instituted by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).2
If a potential passenger's behavior displays these characteristics,
he is designated as a "selectee" and then comes under the surveil-
lance of the magnetometer located at the boarding gate. If the
individual fails to clear the screening tests, he is interviewed and
his identity is verified. A federal marshal is to be available if a
search of the passenger is deemed necessary.
The second major feature of the program is the assignment
of "sky-marshals" to certain planes in an attempt to subdue and
apprehend the hijacker if he succeeds in boarding the aircraft. It
is estimated that currently approximately 1,200 Treasury Depart-
ment agents are assigned to the force.3 While this program may
have deterred some would-be hijackers, it cannot be concluded that
it has been successful. From January 1 to June 14, 1971, fifteen
attempts to hijack United States airliners have occurred. In 1970,
during the same period, there had been only eleven attempts.14
Moreover, eight of the attempts this year have been successful as
compared to six in 1970 in the same period."
Passengers aboard a hijacked aircraft face a harrowing exper-
ience. Their lives and property are in constant danger until the
hijacker has disembarked. At times, they have spent several weeks
in confinement in alien and hostile countries.' 6 On too many occa-
sions both passengers and crew members have been injured or
killed. Theoretically, a passenger could institute an assault or bat-
tery action against a hijacker. However, in the vast majority of
the incidents, such actions would be impractical if not impos-
12. HoRIZONS, Sept. 29, 1969, at 8.
13. N.Y. Times, July 24, 1971, at 16, col. 1.
14. Id.
15. Id. An indication of the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the program may be
gleaned from the incident in which an American Airlines 747 jumbo jet with 221 pas-
sengers aboard was hijacked by a ballpoint-wielding bandit to Havana. The twist to
what would otherwise have been a "routine" hijacking lies in the fact that among the
221 passengers were three United States Marshals and an off-duty FBI agent. Buffalo
Evening News, Nov. 10, 1971, at 66, col. 1.
16. On July 23, 1968, an El Al airplane enroute from Rome to Tel Aviv was
hijacked to Algiers. The Israeli male passengers and crew were held in Algiers until
August 31, 1968. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1971, at 1, col. 7.
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sible to commence.' 7 Generally, hijackers do not possess sufficient
assets to make a tort action worthwhile. Furthermore, such an
action cannot be commenced unless the perpetrator in an inter-
national hijacking case is extradited. Thus, at the present time, a
passenger who has suffered serious physical or emotional injury
in the process of an attempted or successful hijacking may be under
the impression that no compensation is forthcoming.
This article seeks to determine whether liability for failure
to prevent hijackings can be placed on the airlines. An examina-
tion will be made as to what actions can possibly be initiated
against the airlines by a passenger whose plane has been hijacked.
Here a differentiation will be made betweeen the cases where
the passenger is either physically injured or killed by the hijacker
and the typical hijacking situation (e.g., hijackings to Cuba)
where all that can probably be alleged is the incurring of emotional
distress or nervous shock, which may or may not be accompanied
by physical manifestations. Secondly, an analysis will be under-
taken to determine if any additional legal considerations attach
if the flight is international rather than domestic. In the context
of international flights special attention will be given to the pro-
visions of the Montreal Agreement' as well as to the pertinent pro-
visions of the Warsaw Convention'0 and the Guatemala Protocol.20
II. AIRLINE LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES INCURRED AS A RESULT
OF THE HIJACKING OF A DOMESTIC FLIGHT
In order to hold an airline liable for damages incurred as
a result of the hijacking of a domestic flight, negligence on the
part of the airlines will have to be established. It has often been
17. Since 1961, a total of 150 persons have been accused of 115 hijackings of
United States aircraft, and one of foreign registry, engaged in air commerce in
this country....
Of this total . . . 92 are listed as fugitives, two have committed suicide,
three have been acquitted, charges against ten others have been dismissed,
charges against 14 others are pending, and 29 have been convicted in Federal
courts and are serving sentences totaling more than 350 years.
N.Y. Times, July 24, 1971, at 16, col. 2.
18. Special Meeting on Limits for Passengers Under the Warsaw Convention and
the Hague Protocol, Feb. 1-15, 1966, Montreal, Canada, ICAO Doc. 8584-LC/154-1 &
ICAO Doc. 8584-LC/154-2.
19. Warsaw Convention, Oct. 29, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934), T.S. No. 876 (effective
Oct. 12, 1929).
20. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carrier by Air, March 8, 1971, Guatemala City, Guatemala. ICAO Doc.
8932 [hereinafter cited as Guatemala Protocol].
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held that while an airline owes its passengers a very high degree of
care, it is not an insurer of their safety, and therefore before lia-
bility can be.imposed, the plaintiff must prove that his injuries
resulted from the negligence of the airline.21
In general, in order to establish a case of negligence, the
plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the defendant was under
a duty to exercise care towards him, that by acting in a certain
manner that duty was breached, that the breach of duty was the
proximate cause of his injuries, and that as a result of those injuries
he has suffered certain identifiable damages. Some jurisdictions
also require that before a case of negligence can be said to exist
the plaintiff must show that he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.2
In light of these requisites, the first issue which must be
resolved in determining whether the airline can be said to be liable
for injuries to a passenger whose, plane has been hijacked is the
scope of the airline's duty to its passengers. An airline is a common
carrier and like all common carriers bears a very high standard of
care.2 3 While the courts have used different adjectives in character-
izing the scope of this duty, a brief analysis of the language which
they employ evinces an agreement that the duty of care to be
borne by the carrier is an extraordinarily high one. While it has
repeatedly been held that a common carrier is not an insurer of
the safety of its passengers,o24 different occasions it has been
stated that a carrier's duty to its passengers requires the exercise
of the "highest degree of care,"' ' "a very high degree of dili-
gence, 2126 "highest practical degree of care," "utmost care and dili-
21. See Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929 (D. Del. 1962); Ness v.
West Coast Airlines, 90 Ida. 111, 410 P.2d 965 (1964); Griffith v. United Airlines, 416
Pa. I 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
22. See, e.g., Walheim v. City of Batavia, 12 App. Div. 2d 228, 12 N.Y.S.2d 22&
(4th Dep't 1939). See generally W. PROSSER, LAw OF ToRTs § 64 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
23. PROSSER § 34, at 183-84.
24. See Smith v. Baltimore Transit Co., 211 Md. 529, 128 A.2d 413 (1957); Quigley-
v. Wilson Line of Mass., Inc., 338 Mass. 125, 154 N.E2d 77 (1958); Connelly v. Philadel-
phia Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 280, 216 A.2d 60 (1966) ; Seburn v. Luzerne & Carbon County
Motor Transit Co., 394 Pa. 577, 148 A.2d 534 (1959); Shamblee v. Virginia Transit Co.,
204 Va. 591, 132 S.E.2d 712 (1963).
25. Mobile Cab & Baggage Co. v. Busby, 277 Ala. 292, 169 So. 2d 314 (1964);
Collier v. Citizens Coach Co., 231 Ark. 49, 330 S.W.2d 74 (1959). Jacob v. Key System
Transit Lines, 140 Cal. App. 2d 357, 295 P.2d 569 (Dist. Ct. 1956).
26. North v. Williams, 366 P.2d 406 (Oki. 1961); Peoples Checker Cab Co. v.
Dunlap, 307 P.2d 833 (Old. 1957).
27. Angelo v. Pittsburg Ry., Bus Div., 189 Pa. Super. 574, 151 A.2d 867 (1959).
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gence, 28 and the use of "extraordinary care,"2 in transporting
them to their destination.
More specifically, it has been held that the special relationship
which exists between the common carrier and its passengers imposes
a duty upon the carrier to protect its passengers from the wrongful
acts of third persons whether they be its employees, fellow pas-
sengers or strangers.30 On numerous occasions courts have held that
this duty extends to the protection from fellow passengers who have
become inebriated and unruly,31 from fellow passengers who have
threatened violence,32 and from external criminal attacks by third
persons.3 3 For example, in Neering v. Illinois Railroad Co.,,4 the
Supreme Court of Illinois held:
[k]nowledge of conditions which are likely to result in an assault
upon a passenger, or which constitute a source of potential dan-
ger, imposes the duty of active vigilance on the part of the car-
rier's agents and the adoption of such steps as are warranted in
light of the existing hazards.35
A similar rationale was espoused by the court in the case of Yellow
Cab Company of Atlanta v. Carmichael3 when it held:
A common carrier of passengers for hire is bound to use extra-
ordinary care and diligence to protect its passengers in transit
from violence or injury by third persons; and whenever a car-
rier, through its agents and servants, knows, or has opportunity
to know, of a threatened injury to a passenger from third per-
sons, whether such persons are passengers or not, or when the cir-
cumstances are such that injury to a passenger from such a source
might reasonably be anticipated, and proper precautions are not
taken to prevent the injury, the carrier is liable for damages result-
ing therefrom.37
28. Roberts v. Trans World Airlines, 225 Cal. App. 2d 844, 37 Cal. Rptr. 291 (Dist.
Ct. 1964); Andrea v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 144 Conn. 340, 131 A.2d 642 (1957);
Yu v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 145 Conn. 451, 144 A.2d 56 (1958).
29. Metropolitan Transit Sys., Inc. v. Burton, 103 Ga. App. 688, 120 S.E.2d 663
(1961); Atlanta Transit Sys., Inc. v. Allen, 96 Ga. App. 622, 101 S.E.2d 134 (1957).
30. See Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1959); Quig-
ley v. Wilson Line of Mass., Inc., 388 Mass. 125, 154 N.E.2d 77 (1958).
31. Thompson v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 212 S.W .2d 299 (Mo. 1951); Liljegren v.
United Ry., 227 S.W. 925 (Mo. 1921).
32. See discussion, infra note 37.
33. Letsos v. Chicago Transit Authority, 118 Ill. App. 2d. 26, 254 N.E.2d 6415 (1969);
Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943).
34. 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943).
35. Id. at 379, 50 N.E.2d at 503 (emphasis added).
36. 33 Ga. App. 364, 126 S.E. 269 (1925).
37. Id. at 368, 126 S.E. at 271 (emphasis added).
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These two cases, and others which have held likewise," estab-
lish a general rule whereby a carrier may be said to have a definite
duty to protect its passengers from third persons. First, it is
clear that regardless of the source from which the danger arises if
it was known to the carrier or should have been known to him,
proper precautions must be exercised to protect the passenger from
that danger. Secondly, of great importance are the underlying
circumstances at the time of injury.
It is submitted that a breach of duty on the part of the air-
lines, which is an essential element in establishing their negligence,
may be proved by a passenger whose plane has been hijacked.
A passenger purchasing a ticket expects safe transportation to his
destination and the airline should be required to do all that is
possible, within human care and foresight, to transport him safely.
As has been stated above, the high duty imposed on carriers for
the protection of its passengers includes the responsibility for the
prevention of assaults by third persons. In light of this standard
the airlines may be said to have breached their duty where they
have failed to use sophisticated detection mechanisms and other
screening devices at all, or where their use was conducted in a
negligent or haphazard manner by employees or independent con-
tractors.30 On several occasions in the past it has been held that
38. See Sue v. Chicago Transit Authority, 279 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1960); Florida
East Coast Ry. v. Booth, 348 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1963); Fuller v. Southwestern Greyhound
Lines, 331 S.'W.2d 455 (Tex. 1960).
39. Even though the airline had knowledge of the probability of a hijacking, the
careless use of detecting mechanisms failed to avert a hijacking as illustrated in the fol-
lowing example:
The man who hijacked a Trans World Airlines jetliner at LaGuardia Airport
[on June 23, 1971] had aroused the suspicions of airline employees enough to
make them search a small bag he was carrying aboard the plane. But no weapon
was found, so the line's agents let him board the aircraft.
A small blue signal light on a metal-sensing antihijacking device was tripped
when the passenger, who was identified last night as Richard A. Obergfell,
walked in a corridor toward the aircraft.
Airline agents said the passenger showed several unspecified behavior traits
that in the past had been common to many hijackers.
Since he fell within what airline security officers call the 'hijacker behavioral
profile,' and the metal-sensing alarm was tripped, the man was stopped and ques-
tioned by an airline agent.
The passenger was not searched physically before boarding, but the agent
asked him to open his coat so he could see whether any weapons were concealed.
None was observed. His carry-on luggage was inspected, however.
'We found several [metal] items in the bag that could have tripped the de-
tection device, so he was let through,' a T.W.A. spokesman said.
N.Y. Times, July 24, 1971, at 16, col. 1.
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a common carrier is "liable for injuries caused by the negligence
of its hired officers where their negligence [constituted] a breach of
the carrier's duty of vigilance in behalf of its passengers." 40 In
Quigley v., Wilson Line of Massachusetts4 the court stated: "[e]ven
if the hired police officers . . . were acting as independent con-
tractors... the defendant common carrier was not thereby relieved
from its liability for the negligence of those officers in not ade-
quately protecting the plaintiff against a foreseeable risk. '42
In addition, it has long been held that an airline's failure to
equip its aircraft with adequate safety devices constitutes action-
able negligence. 8 Although traditionally such cases concern safety
devices on board the aircraft, the underlying rationale can logically
be extended to safety devices located at the boarding gate. In both
instances, the interest sought to be protected is the safety of the
passengers and crew, and, as a result, neglect in both cases should
be actionable.
In addition to proving that the airlines have breached their
duty of care, the issue which must be resolved before their lia-
bility can be established is whether the hijacker's acts break the
chain of causation so completely as to supersede the airlines' negli-
gence as the proximate cause of the injury to the passenger.44 If the
hijacker's actions were reasonably foreseeable, while they may
intervene in the chain of causation, they will not break it.4 The
reason for thisi resuilt is that the airline is charged with the respon-
sibility of foreseeing third party actions that could reasonably be
expected to intervene between its negligent action and the ultimate
injury. Thus, in spite of the hijacker's intervening negligent
action, the airlines' original negligence remains the proximate
cause of the' injury." This point was clearly delineated by
Professor Prosser when he stated, "[i]f the intervening cause'is one
which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated,
or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the par-
40. Quigley v. Wilson Line of Mass., 338 Mass. 125, 150, 154 N.E.2d 77, 80 (1958).
41. 338 Mass. 125, 154 NE,.2d 77 (1958).
42. Id. at 120, 154 N.E2d at 80.
43. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 937 (1956).
44. See generally PRossER § 51.
45. Id.
46. Neering v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943); Garibaldi &
Cuneo v. O'Connor, 210 Ill. 284, 71 N.E. 379 (1904).
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ticular circumstances, he may be negligent among other reasons,
because he failed to guard against it."47 The risk created by the
defendant is not restricted to the intervention of foreseeable negli-
gent acts by others, but includes those "intentional or criminal
acts which the defendant might reasonably anticipate, and against
which he would be required to take precautions.... [O]nce it is
determined that the defendant's duty requires him to anticipate
the intervening misconduct, and guard against it, it follows that it
can not supersede his liability. '48 Thus the airline may be held
liable since it may be said that it had made a substantial contribu -
tion to the injury by its failure to carefully search potential hi-
jackers or to employ other sophisticated detection methods, even
though the injuries would not have occurred without the hijacker's
acts.49
It is submitted that recurrent hijacking attacks strongly sug-
gest the imminence of others and therefore the attention of the air-
line should be directed towards their prevention. To suggest that
the airlines were not aware of the threat of future hijackings or
could not foresee them is to ignore the harsh reality of the state of
air commerce. It is not suggested that the airlines should be the
insurers of their passengers' safety, but it is contended that in a
situation where a series of hijackings have occurred, the burden of
proof, where serious injury is suffered by a passenger, should be
placed on the airline to show that it has done everything possible
to avert the attacks, regardless of whether or not one of its own
planes was hijacked in the recent past. The airline is in a position
to prevent the hijacker from accomplishing his criminal act, while
the passenger is in no way capable of doing so. Though it may be
argued that a carrier should not be liable to a passenger for injuries
which arose out of sudden, unanticipated assaults committed by
persons not in its employ, injuries to a passenger after due notice
that criminal activity involving the use of weapons has occurred,
and is likely to occur, present a totally different situation.
The issue which remains to be resolved is whether damages
should be restricted to the case of actual bodily injury or death
or whether a passenger who, although not physically injured by the
hijacker, may have a cause of action for negligently inflicted mental
47. Paossi § 51, at 311 (footnotes omitted).
48. Id. at 313-14.
49. Id.
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distress against the airline. This issue is of extreme importance
since most hijackings to date have not involved the actual inflic-
tion of physical injury upon passengers by the hijacker.
Traditionally, the common law did not recognize a separate
cause of action for negligently inflicted mental distress. The atti-
tude of the common law was succinctly stated by Lord Wensley-
dale when he stated: "[m]ental pain or anxiety the law cannot
value, and does not pretend to redress when the unlawful act ...
causes that alone .... , Several arguments have been offered to
support this rationale. They have ranged from the allegation that it
is difficult to prove, to the allegation that even if proved it would be
difficult to assess the monetary damages, and perhaps most import-
antly, to the contention that if suits for negligent mental distress
were permitted, many spurious actions would be commenced.5 '
The first breakthrough in permitting recovery for negli-
gently inflicted mental distress occurred when the courts permit-
ted recovery where the defendant's negligent acts caused physi-
cal injuries to the plaintiff which were accompanied by mental
distress.2 Where physical injury was caused by the defendant's
negligence, the courts have allowed "compensation for purely
mental elements of damage accompanying it, such as fright at the
time of the injury, apprehension as to its effects, and nervous-
ness . . ."53
For many years the courts restricted recovery for mental dis-
tress to cases where "impact" occurred. For example, in Mitchell
v. Rochester Railway Co.., the courts denied recovery to
a pregnant woman who, although not physically touched, was
caused to abort her child by the defendant's negligent driving.
In Mitchell, the defendant drove his horses in such a reckless
manner that when he was finally able to stop them, the plaintiff
was trapped between their heads. In denying recovery in the plain-
tiff's action for nervous shock, the court held that there could be
no recovery for injuries either physical or mental incurred by the
fright negligently induced when not accompanied by impact.55
50. Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (Ex. 1861).
51. PROssER § I1, at 43.
52. Id. at 44.
53. PROSSER § 55, at 349 (footnotes omitted). These damages have been labeled
"parasitic" since they only attach if a cause of action for physical injury is established.
See PROSSER § 11, at 44.
54. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
55. Id. at 109, 45 N.E. at 354.
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In recent times, the impact doctrine has been abandoned by
most jurisdictions. Following this trend, the New York Court of
Appeals in 1961, in the case of Battalla v. State, 6 explicitly over-
ruled the Mitchell case. In Battalla, an employee of the State of
New York, after having placed the plaintiff infant on a ski lift,
failed to properly secure the belt which was intended to protect the
child. As a result, the infant became frightened and hysterical upon
descent and suffered severe emotional and neurological disturb-
ances with physical manifestations, The State of New York sought
to dismiss the complaint as not stating a cause of action since no
impact had occurred. This argument was rejected by the Court
of Appeals which held that the absence of impact did not fore-
close recovery for physical or mental injuries incurred by fright
negligently induced.57 In ruling in favor of the plaintiff, the court
stated:
[i]t is fundamental to our common-law system that one may
seek redress for every substantial wrong. . . . ts8
... In many instances, just as in impact cases, there will be
no doubt as to ,the presence and extent of the damage and the
fact that it was proximately caused by defendant's negligence.
In the difficult cases, we must look to the quality and genuine-
ness of proof, and rely to an extent on the contemporary sophis-
tication of the medical profession and the ability of the court
and jury to weed out the dishonest claims. Claimant should,
therefore, be given an opportunity to prove that her injuries
were proximately caused by defendant's negligence.5 0
It is understood that there must be limitations in this type
of action. It is not advocated that all a plaintiff should have to do
in order to recover is enter a court of law and announce that he was
upset by the hijacker. But if the passenger can show that the
hijacking incident resulted in mental distress manifested, for ex-
ample, by continuing nervousness, nausea, severe headaches, or a
permanent psychiatric condition, he should be able to recover
for his loss of earnings, pain and suffering and medical expenses
which he incurred through no fault of his own. The possibility
that a number of spurious actions will be initiated is certainly pres-
56. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.YS.2d 34 (1961).
57. Id. at 239, 176 N.E2d at 730, 219 N.YS.2d at 36.
58. Id. at 240, 176 N.E.2d at 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 36.
59. Id. at 242, 176 N.E.2d at 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
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ent, but as the court in Battalla suggested the courts and juries
possess sufficient sophistication to weed out those claims. Further-
more, it is submitted that the possibility of successful spurious ac-
tions does not outweigh the injustice which would occur if a pas-
senger who, through no fault of his own incurred serious psychi-
atric damage, yet was not permitted to recover.
III. AIRLINE LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES INCURRED AS A RESULT
OF A HIJACKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT
In 1929, the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Transportation by Air, commonly
known as the Warsaw Convention,60 came into being. The United
States ratified the Convention on October 29, 1934 and from
that date until the advent of the Montreal Agreement in 1966, its
provisions controlled most of the major issues encountered by
litigants in international aviation cases involving injury or death.
The primary purpose of the Convention was to establish a unified
standard which would govern the rights and duties of both air-
lines and passengers in international air travel. In light of this
goal the members of the Convention enacted a number of pro-
visions which governed regardless of where the injury occurred.
Article 17 of the Convention created a presumption of lia-
bility on the part of the airlines if injury or death occurred. It
states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event
of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily
injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the
course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.012
It should be noted, however, that while a presumption of lia-
bility exists, the airline is not absolutely liable. Article 20 of the
Convention provides that the carrier shall not be liable if he proves
that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid
the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such
measures. If the airline does not meet the article 20 standard, it
incurs liability.
60. See supra note 19.
61. See supra note 18.
62. 49 Stat. 3018 (1934), 137 L.N.T.S. 23 (1929).
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Article 22 of the Convention limits the recovery to the sum
of 125,000 francs or $8,300. This limitation is applicable both
in a personal injury and a wrongful death case. There is only
one exception to the limitation of damages, that of article 25 (1)
of the Convention which provides:
The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the pro-
visions of this Convention which exclude or limit his liability,
if the damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such de-
fault on his part as, in accordance with the law of the Court
to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent
to wilful misconduct.63
In September 1955, the Warsaw Convention was amended
by the Hague Protocol." This Protocol increased the maximum
liability of the airlines from $8,300 to $16,600.5 While the United
States was one of the signatories of the Protocol, it never ratified
it.. In 1965, the United States, not satisfied with the low recovery
permitted by the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol,
gave notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention.6 On May
14, 1966, with the advent of the Montreal Agreement, it withdrew
its notice of denunciation. This agreement substantially enhanced
the recovery by a passenger (or his estate) for injuries or wrongful
death during an international flight when the United States was
a point of origin, a point of destination, or a scheduled stopping
point of that flight. The Montreal Agreement modified the pro-
visions of the Warsaw Convention in two important respects. First,
the Agreement replaced the presumption of liability standard with
absolute liability. Second, it increased the maximum recovery per-
mitted from $8,300 to $75,000.67
The Montreal Agreement is of crucial significance for per-
sons who initiate actions against airlines to recover damages for
death or injuries suffered as the result of a hijacking. Upon enter-
63. 49 Stat. 3021 (1934), 137 L.N.T.S. 27 (1929) (emphasis added).
64. ICAO Doc. 7686-LC/140-1 & ICAO Doc. 7686-LC/140-2.
65. U.S. CIVIL AiRONAUTics BOARD, AERONAUricAL STATUTS AND R ATED MATERiAls
383 (rev. ed. 1971).
66. 53 Dep't State Bull. 924 (1965).
67. CAB Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). The Montreal Agreement is
not an international treaty but is merely an agreement between air carriers approved by
the United States Government. Such an agreement is sanctioned by article 22 (1) of the
Warsaw Convention. For a thorough discussion of the Montreal Agreement, see Lowen-
feld & Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REv.
497 (1967).
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ing the Agreement the airlines involved waived their defense under
article 20 (1) of the Convention as well as the limitation of lia-
bility under article 22 of the Convention. The dual waiver of
article 22 and article 20 (1) of the Warsaw Convention places a
very light burden of proof upon the plaintiff before he can recover
for his injuries. In regard to the waiver of article 20 (1), the
Civil Aeronautics Board in adopting the Montreal Agreement
stated:
[t]he parties [referring to the airlines who are members of the
Agreement] ... agree to provide in their tariffs -that the Car-
rier shall not, with respect to any claim arising out of the death,
wounding, or other bodily injury of a passenger, avail itself of
any defense under Article 20(1) of the Convention . .. as
amended by the Protocol 08
In light of this part of the agreement, there is little doubt that
any passenger who has been actually wounded by a hijacker could
obtain damages from the airline, since the airline's obligation to
him, according to the Agreement, clearly comes into being as
soon as he boards the craft and does not end until he has alighted
from it at his point of destination.
A more difficult issue to resolve is whether a passenger may,
within the provisions of the Agreement, collect for medical
expenses, pain and suffering, loss of earnings or other damages
which resulted from the emotional distress he suffered during the
hijacking episode. The overwhelming majority of passengers in-
volved to date in hijackings have not actually been wounded by
the hijacker and as a result could not point to obvious physical in-
juries after their ordeal had ended. There is little doubt, however,
that serious physical and neurological disturbances may result
after an individual has been held captive on board an aircraft
under a constant threat of death for extended periods of time in
flight or after the plane has landed at a hostile airport.
It should be noted that the language of the Agreement speaks
in terms of "wounding or other bodily injury" of a passenger."0 As
such, a two-pronged problem arises. First, it must be determined
if such physical disturbances as nausea, ulcers, nervousness and
severe headaches which result from emotional distress may be
said to constitute "bodily injury" within the meaning of the Mon-
68. CAB Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966) (emphasis added).
69. Id.
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treal Agreement. Secondly, it must be ascertained whether a psychi-
atric condition such as neurosis, insomnia or the constant recur-
rence of nightmares is per se excluded by the language of the
Agreement or whether it may be said to be included within it.
The resolution of these issues is vital if successful actions are to be
brought against airlines to compel them to equitably compensate a
passenger who was severely and perhaps permanently injured
through no fault of his own. (A collateral benefit of the initiation
of successful law suits would be the resultant diligent use by airlines
of the most sophisticated detection methods possible to avert
future hijackings.) If these actions may be said to fall within the
wording of the Montreal Agreement, a passenger would not be
required to prove negligence on the part of the airline before he
could collect since the Agreement promulgates an absolute liability
standard. All he would have to do is show that he was on the plane
when the hijacking occurred, and prove the extent of his damages
up to $75,000.
It is submitted that those cases which result in physical
manifestations are more likely to be interpreted by the courts as
falling within the wording of the Agreement, but the possibility cer-
tainly exists that psychiatric injuries may also be included. The
wording "death, wounding or other bodily injury" contained in
the Montreal Agreement is almost identical to the wording of arti-
cle 17 of the Warsaw Convention." In the case of American Air-
lines, Inc. v. Ulen,7 decided by the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, the court per-
mitted recovery for emotional distress. The Court of Appeals in
Ulen stated:
[The plaintiff] is entitled to recover such sum of money as ...
will fairly and reasonably and adequately compensate her for
the physical injuries and the disabilities which she sustained by
reason of this accident, together with pain and suffering and
anguish which she has endured, as well as the mental and nervous
shock and any and all perman-ent injuries which you might find
either physically or to her mental and nervous system.72
70. "The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wound-
ing of a passenger or any other bodily injury. ... 49 Stat. 3018 (1934), 137 L.N.T.S.
23 (1929).
71. 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
72. This extract does not appear in the reported opinion of the court, but in the
version reproduced in ICAO, CAsES ON THE WARSAW CONVENTION [1929-1955], ICAO Doc.
36, § 2, at 87 (1955) (emphasis added).
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A finding that these injuries are covered by the Montreal
Agreement does not necessarily mean that $75,000 is all a plain-
tiff could hope to collect. He may still be in a position to in-
stitute a cause of action under the wilful misconduct exception
of the Warsaw Convention.
Before analyzing whether a passenger whose plane was hi-
jacked may be able to obtain compensation beyond the $75,000
limitation of the Montreal Agreement by initiating an action
under the wilful misconduct exception of the Warsaw Conven-
tion for both his physical injuries incurred on board the aircraft
and those which resulted from the severe emotional distress he
suffered during the hijacking episode, it should be pointed out
that the Montreal Agreement by no means excludes this possi-
bility. This fact is made perfectly clear by a Department of State
memorandum concerning the Warsaw Convention and the Mon-
treal Agreement dated May 5, 1966 which states:
In essence, absolute liability [referring to the Montreal Agree-
ment] in this context means that a claimant would not be re-
quired to prove fault on the part of the carrier, but only the
amount of damages. Claimant would be able to recover the
amount of his provable damages, though subject to a maximum
limitation of $75,000. Should the claimant, under Article 25 of
the Convention, [referring to the Warsaw Convention] attempt
to prove wilful misconduct on the part of the carrier, the ques-
tion of fault would of course be in issue. In such a case, should
claimant succeed in proving wilful misconduct, he would be
subject to no limitation on his recovery.78
Article 25 (1) of the Warsaw Convention which contains the
wilful misconduct exception provides that what constitutes wil-
ful misconduct is to be ascertained "in accordance with the law
of the Court to which the case is submitted." Thus, in order to
determine what the term wilful misconduct means, a brief analy-
sis has to be undertaken to determine how the American courts
have defined it.
In Grey v. American Airlines4 the court stated:
There is no dispute as to what constitutes wilful misconduct.
The instructions required proof of 'a conscious intent to do or
73. Dep't of State Memo, United States Government Action Concerning the Warsaw
Convention 4 (1966), reprinted in L. KEMNDLER, AVIATION ACMDENT LAw 380 (Supp.
1970) (emphasis added).
74. 227 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 US. 989 (1956).
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omit doing an act from which harm results to another, or an
intentional omission of a manifest duty. There must be a real-
ization of the probability of injury from the conduct, and a
disregard of the probable consequences of such conduct.'75
In light of this holding, aside from establishing a breach of duty
on the part of the airline which was discussed in the domestic
flight section, the passenger would have to prove that such a
breach constituted an intentional omission on the part of the air-
line. In the case of American Airlines, Inc. v. Ulen, while the
court did not require the showing of an intentional omission to
establish wilful misconduct; it did require proof that the airline
acted with reckless and wanton disregard of probable conse-
quences.
Perhaps the most favorable interpretation of wilful miscon-
duct from the point of view of the hijacked plaintiff occurred
in the case of Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines,
Ltd.,77 where the following charge concerning the definition of wil-
ful misconduct was given to the jury:
'[W]ilful misconduct' . . . would be [the] reckless disregard
of the probable consequences, that is, of the safety of the air-
craft and of its passengers, if the pilot intentionally did act,
or failed to do an act, which it was his duty to the passengers
to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would
lead a reasonable man to realize that his conduct not only cre-
ated an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the passengers, but
also involved a high degree of probability that substantial harm
would result to the aircraft and the passengers by doing or
failing to do the act in questionY8
The latter part of the charge, in which the words "a reasonable
man" were used, brings the concept of wilful misconduct closer to
an ordinary negligence case than the other cases mentioned above.
While the latter part of the Berner charge may not suffice to tip
the balance in favor of the plaintiff in all cases involving hi-
jacking, a strong argument may be put forth that in a situation
75. Id. at 285.
76. 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
77. 219 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). For an excellent discussion of the Berner
case and the wilful misconduct issue as a whole, see L. KImNDLnR, AvxrION AccIDENT
LAw 350-60 (1963).
78. Berner v. British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 219 F. Supp. 289, 360
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (emphasis added).
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where a series of hijackings or threats of hijackings have occurred
in a relatively short period of time (such as the Arab guerilla
hijackings in the fall of 1970), the rule enunciated in the Berner
case would subject the airline to liability if it did not do all that
modem technology afforded in thwarting hijackings. In addition,
another part of the charge enunciated by the court in the Berner
case may be of extreme significance in times to come. In Berner
the trial judge stated:
where must be an actual and continuous sequence connect-
ing the act of wilful misconduct . .. with the death .... I say
,that the wilful misconduct must be a substantial factor in bringing
about the death. You will note I did not say it must be the sole
substantial factor contributing to the death. In other words, if you
find that wilful misconduct by the defendant or any of its em-
ployees was a substantial contributing factor to the death... [then
it] is sufficient to sustain the plaintiff's claim even though you may
find that there were also other substantial contributing factors.70
The application of this latter standard to the hijacking
situation is of great importance, since if the courts find the air-
lines guilty of wilful misconduct, the fact that the hijacker com-
mitted the actual injury would not absolve them from liability.
While it is submitted that the possibility exists that a wilful mis-
conduct case may be established, it is uncertain whether the
courts will be willing to extend the airline's liability to such a
degree.
IV. THE GUATEMALA PROTOCOL-AMENDMENTS TO THE WARSAW
CONVENTION
In the winter of 1971, a diplomatic conference was convened
in Guatemala City under the auspices of the International Civil
Aviation Organization for the purpose of amending the Warsaw
Convention. This conference was attended by fifty-five states and
adopted a Protocol to the Warsaw Convention which called for
absolute liability and a substantial increase in the compensation
for air passengers in the case of injury or death.80 The Guatemala
Protocol, article 4, would amend article 17 (1) of the Warsaw Con-
vention to provide:
79. Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
80. See 64 Dep't of State Bull. 555 (1971) ; 65 AAT. J. INT. L. 670 (1971).
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The carrier is liable for damage -sustained in case of death or
personal injury of a passenger upon condition only that the
event which caused the death or injury took place on board
the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of em-
barking or disembarking.81
There are only two occasions in which the air carrier is absolved
from liability. Article 17 (1) as amended provides: "the carrier
is not liable if the death or injury resulted solely from the state
of health of the passenger."8 2 Article 21 of the Warsaw Con-
vention was deleted by article VII of the Protocol and replaced
by:
If the carrier proves that the damage was caused or contributed
to by the negligence or other wrongful acts or omission of the
person claiming compensation, the carrier shall be wholly or
partly exonerated from his liability to such person to the extent
that such negligence or wrongful act or omission caused or con-
tributed to the damage.8
According to the terms of the Protocol, the airlines would
be absolutely liable up to a $100,000 limit per passenger. Article
22(1) (a) of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Protocol
provides:
In the carriage of persons the liability of the carrier is limited
to the sum of one million five hundred thousand francs for
the aggregate of the claims, however founded, in respect of
damage suffered as a result of the death or personal injury of
each passenger. Where, in accordance with the law of the court
seised of the case, damages may be awarded in the form of periodic
payments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall
not exceed one million five hundred thousand francs.84
81. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 20, at 7.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 8.
84. Id. In addition, article 22 (3) (a) of the Warsaw Convention as amended by
article VIII of the Guatemala Protocol provides:
The courts of the High Contracting Parties which are not authorized under
their law to award the costs of the action, including lawyers' fees, shall, in
actions to which this Convention applies, have the power to award, in their dis-
cretion, to the claimant the whole or part of the costs of the action, including
lawyers' fees which the court considers reasonable.
Guatemala Protocol, supra note 20, at 8.
Article 22 (3) (b) as amended provides:
The costs of the action including lawyers' fees shall be awarded in accordance
with subparagraph (a) only if the claimant gives a written notice to the carrier
of the amount claimed including the particulars of the calculation of that
amount and the can-ier does not make, within a period .of six months after
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The Protocol further provides that the parties to it will meet
every five years after the Protocol enters into force for the purpose
of reviewing this limit, and unless the parties to the Protocol de-
cide to the contrary, the limit will be extended by the sum of
$12,500. 5 These provisions are of particular significance in future
actions commenced by passengers hijacked during an international
flight, since once the Guatemala Protocol enters into force, they
may be able to recover under an absolute liability standard
$100,000 and after a period of ten years, $125,000 instead of the
current $75,000 permitted by the Montreal Agreement.
It should be noted, however, that while the proposed amend-
ments just discussed favor the passenger in that a higher maxi-
mum liability on the part of the airlines is called for, their effects
are somewhat balanced by the more restrictive language of the
wilful misconduct exception. Article 25 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion as amended by the Protocol provides:
The limit of liability specified in Paragraph 2 of Article 22
shall not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from an
act or omission of the carrier, his servants or agents, done with
intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that
damage would probably result; provided that, in the case of
such act or omission of a servant or agent, it is also proved
that he was acting within the scope of his employment. 8
Prior to the proposed amendment of article 25, the task of defin-
ing what constitutes wilful misconduct was to be ascertained "in
accordance with the law of the Court to which the case is sub-
mitted."8' 7 Under the proposed amendment, which is still subject
to judicial interpretation, an international standard defining
wilful misconduct has been formulated. At present it appears
that a passenger, in order to recover damages above and beyond
the maximum permitted under the absolute liability standard of
ihe Guatemala Protocol, must prove intent, or recklessness cou-
his receipt of such notice, a written offer of settlement in an amount at least
equal to the compensation awarded within the applicable limit. This period
will be extended until the time of commencement of the action if that is later.
Id. at 8-9. Article 22 (3) (c) as amended provides: "The costs of the action including
lawyers' fees shall not be taken into account in applying the limits under this Article."
Id. at 9.
85. Guatemala Protocol, supra note 20, at 10.
86. Id. at 9.
87. 49 Stat. 3020 (1934), 137 L.N.TS. 26 (1929).
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pled with knowledge that damages would probably result on the
part of the airlines.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted that the possibility of being
involved in litigation whose outcome could result in a large award
of damages may persuade the airlines to use the utmost security
methods possible to avert hijackings. Awards of substantial dam-
ages, and the unfavorable publicity which would ensue, may pro-
vide the necessary incentive to protect innocent lives in the fu-
ture. There seems to be a direct correlation between financial
loss and protective action taken by the airlines. It was after the
destruction of the first jet hijacked to Syria that sophisticated
detection mechanisms came on the scene. Perhaps the knowl-
edge that substantial judgments would be awarded to hijacked
passengers who have suffered serious physical and emotional in-
juries would assure that such incidents would rarely occur in
future times. Furthermore, and just as importantly, an innocent
passenger who had suffered through no fault of his own could
and would be adequately compensated.

